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In this article, Chamberlain analyzes the EU
General Court ruling in Apple, and examines
state aid and transfer pricing in the EU, with a
focus on (and as an advocate for) the existence
of an autonomous arm’s-length principle.
All opinions and errors are solely the
author’s.
By any measure, Apple is at the top of the
barrel. Its current market capitalization is $2
1
trillion. Global sales for 2019 topped $260 billion,
and its pretax profit was nearly $66 billion.2 When
it comes to aggressive tax planning, Apple has
long been a trailblazer. In early 2013 Sens. Carl
Levin and John McCain led a bipartisan blameand-shame campaign, leading to the release of
their now-infamous subcommittee report on
Apple’s profit shifting in May 2013.3 Tipped off,
the European Commission soon followed suit,
launching a state aid investigation that resulted in
a claim that Apple had underpaid its Irish taxes by
€13 billion between 2003 and 2014. The
commission’s August 2016 decision seeking to
compel Apple to repay those taxes marks by far
4
the largest state aid recovery ever pursued.
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Ycharts, “Apple Market Cap” (Aug. 20, 2020).

Moral judgments aside, few observers would
deny that Apple’s tax structuring has been very
aggressive. The European Commission alleged
that Ireland aided and abetted Apple through its
advance ruling practice, which purportedly gave
Apple an unfair advantage over and above that
offered by Ireland’s porous general tax regime.
Apple worked its magic by setting up a pair of
Irish-incorporated subsidiaries that were not taxresident anywhere in the world. And those
nonresident Irish companies had branch
operations in Ireland that were subject to Ireland’s
headline 12.5 percent tax rate. However, the tax
rulings that the commission challenged —
advance rulings that Ireland issued in 1991 and
2007 — allocated only a paltry share of the
companies’ profits to the Irish branches, leaving
the lion’s share of the profits with the so-called
head offices that did not pay taxes in Ireland, the
United States, or anywhere. To give just one
example, according to paragraph 97 in the Apple
commission decision, in 2011 one of the Irish
subsidiaries paid the equivalent of $9 million in
Irish taxes on $22 billion of pretax profit — a tax
rate of just 0.041 percent.
On July 15 the General Court of the European
5
Union annulled the commission’s decision. If the
court’s decision is upheld after appeal to the Court
of Justice of the European Union, Apple will get
back €13 billion that is being held in an escrow
account. At the end of the day, Treasury is the real
winner here. Even though the IRS never
challenged Apple’s machinations or attempted to
collect U.S. taxes on the shifted profits at the then-

Apple SEC Form 10-K for fiscal year ending Sept. 28, 2019.
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Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, “Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S.
Tax Code — Part 2” (May 21, 2013) (hereinafter, Senate report).
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European Commission Decision on State Aid SA.38373 (2014/C) (ex
2014/NN) (ex 2014/CP) implemented by Ireland to Apple, C(2016) 5605
final (Aug. 30, 2016) (hereinafter, Apple commission decision).
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Apple Sales International and Apple Operations Europe v. European
Commission, joined cases T-778/16 and T-892/16 (GCEU 2020) (hereinafter,
Apple judgment). For prior coverage, see Ryan Finley, “EU Court Rules
Against European Commission in Apple State Aid Case,” Tax Notes Int’l,
July 20, 2020, p. 301.
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applicable 35 percent corporate tax rate, the entire
amount has presumably been deemed repatriated
and taxed at a 15.5 percent rate under section 965
in accordance with the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. In
contrast, if Ireland kept the tax windfall, Treasury
would have to provide Apple with a refund in the
form of foreign tax credits.
The commission lost its case before the
General Court despite prevailing on the recently
created and much-maligned theory that an
“autonomous” arm’s-length principle is inherent
6
in European competition law. The arm’s-length
principle is, of course, the foundation of transfer
pricing law in most countries. However, at the
time the Apple rulings were issued, Ireland was a
notable exception: Ireland did not adopt
comprehensive transfer pricing legislation until
the Finance Act of 2010. The commission’s leap of
imagination in the state aid cases — that is, the
recent disputes involving Apple, Fiat, and
Starbucks (discussed further in this section) — is
its view that the EU’s founding treaties require EU
nations to follow the arm’s-length principle
irrespective of whether they have formally
7
adopted it in their national tax law.
The arm’s-length principle requires
companies that are part of a multinational
enterprise to transact with each other on the same
terms and at the same prices as unrelated parties
would in similar circumstances. Without the
arm’s-length principle, a group could shift profits
from a highly taxed affiliate that owns valuable
intangibles to an affiliate in a tax haven by
licensing the intangibles to the tax-haven affiliate
8
at a below-market royalty rate. With the
principle, however, if tax authorities in the hightax country detected profit shifting, they could
invoke the arm’s-length principle to adjust the

royalty rate and tax the related-party licensor on
the royalty income it should have received.
But what if the high-tax country — say,
Ireland9 — does not want the forgone tax
revenue? Perhaps the country has decided that it
values encouraging foreign investment more
highly than collecting tax revenue. What if the
Irish tax authorities give the local licensor a
sweetheart deal and bless the below-market
royalty, arm’s-length principle be damned? In the
eyes of the European Commission, Ireland would
be illegally subsidizing the taxpayer — that is,
providing state aid in violation of article 107 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
— and giving the taxpayer an unfair competitive
advantage over all other enterprises operating in
the EU.
In last year’s Fiat and Starbucks cases,10 the
General Court handed the commission a decisive
win on the question of whether there is an
autonomous arm’s-length principle. That is, the
court endorsed the notion that the arm’s-length
principle is embedded in EU competition law and
then proceeded to consider whether the
commission had applied the principle correctly. In
Fiat, the court concluded that the commission
applied the arm’s-length principle properly, and it
found that Luxembourg had indeed given illegal
state aid to Fiat’s financing subsidiary. No more
11
than €30 million was at stake — less than 0.3
percent of the money at stake in Apple — but the
precedent is important. While Starbucks won its
case, the court did not fault the commission for
trying to apply the arm’s-length principle — just
for doing a bad job of it.
The rationale for the autonomous arm’slength principle is that a nation’s income tax
should not favor members of affiliated groups
over stand-alone companies by virtue of how
their taxable profits are measured. Operating in a
free and competitive market, stand-alone
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For an argument that an autonomous arm’s-length principle is not
valid, see Stephen Daly, “The Constitutional Implications of an EU Arm’s
Length Principle,” 60(2/3) Eur. Tax’n 70 (2020).
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Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid as Referred to in
Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
2016/C 262/01, at paras. 167-174 (July 19, 2016).
8

While this hypothetical bears similarities to the Apple case, it differs
in significant ways. Most notably, the example deals with transfer
pricing between affiliated companies rather than allocation of profits
between a head office and a branch.
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That is to say, with its highly competitive 12.5 percent tax rate,
Ireland is still a high-tax country compared with a tax haven that collects
no corporate tax at all.
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Luxembourg v. Commission, joined cases T-755/15 and T-759/15
(GCEU 2019) (hereinafter Fiat judgment); and Netherlands v. Commission,
joined cases T-760/15 and T-636/16 (GCEU 2019) (hereinafter, Starbucks
judgment).
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Finley, “EU Court Overturns Starbucks State Aid Decision, Affirms
Fiat,” Tax Notes Int’l, Sept. 30, 2019, p. 1357.
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companies necessarily engage in transactions on
an arm’s-length basis. The court in Fiat and
Starbucks agreed with the commission that
transactions between affiliated companies must
be undertaken as if they were at arm’s-length to
ensure that the affiliates do not gain a competitive
advantage. And, thus, the autonomous arm’slength principle was born.
The Apple court does not dispute the Starbucks
precedent. But the Apple court’s imagination
begins to falter when deciding whether the
autonomous arm’s-length principle should also
apply to the allocation of profits between a head
office and a branch. The court’s discussion on this
point is ambiguous. It should not be. The case for
the arm’s-length principle in the branch context is
every bit as strong as in the context of transfer
pricing between affiliated companies. If a branch
could understate its profits compared with an
independent competitor, the branch would enjoy
an unfair advantage.
Key to applying the arm’s-length principle to
branch profit determinations is the allocation of
assets, such as Apple’s valuable intangible
property, between the head office and the branch.
International guidance on this question —
specifically, the authorized OECD approach
(AOA)12 — makes clear that the allocation
depends on a comparison of functions performed
by the head office with those performed by the
branch. Equally importantly, the AOA would not
automatically assign contracts, like Apple’s costsharing and marketing services agreements, to the
head office. Rather, a similar allocation process
would be required.
An autonomous arm’s-length principle would
demand such a comparison of functions, but the
court’s imagination failed entirely here. Instead,
the court looked to Irish case law — specifically,
13
the Dataproducts case — to allocate profits to the
branches based on a unilateral review of their
functions and to automatically allocate contracts
and intangible property to the head office. This
brings us to the crucial question raised by Apple:
For purposes of EU competition law, are branch

12

See OECD, “2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent
Establishments” (July 22, 2010) (hereinafter, 2010 PE profits report).

profit determinations based on each nation’s
interpretation of the arm’s-length principle or are
they based on an autonomous arm’s-length
principle and guided by international best
practices?
Perhaps the General Court has flinched and
seeks to back away from the autonomous arm’slength principle. The CJEU has not officially
spoken on the existence of the autonomous
principle. Moreover, an autonomous principle is
not strictly necessary to reach the end results of
the Fiat and Starbucks rulings; they could just as
well have been based on the domestic laws in
Luxembourg and the Netherlands, which
incorporate the arm’s-length principle. Arguably,
the problems that the state aid cases sought to
remedy have already been fixed — at least, on a
prospective basis — through the OECD’s base
erosion and profit-shifting project and the tax
reform efforts in Ireland and the United States. In
the final verdict, it may be that the European
Commission simply asked for too much, too soon.
I. Apple’s Profit Shifting
A. The U.S. Perspective
When Levin and McCain investigated Apple’s
aggressive tax planning, they did not mince
words. On page 5 of their report, they state:
Apple’s “actions disadvantage Apple’s domestic
competitors, force other taxpayers to shoulder the
tax burden Apple has cast off, and undermine the
fairness of the U.S. tax code.” The senators’
preferred remedies called for strengthening the
tax code’s transfer pricing rules and enforcing
existing rules to subject the Irish subsidiaries’
profits to current U.S. taxation.
The crux of the senators’ transfer pricing
complaints was that U.S. cost-sharing rules made
it too easy to transfer ownership of valuable
intangibles to foreign subsidiaries that have little
substance. Apple’s Irish subsidiaries were the
poster children for low-substance cost-sharing
participants. Considerable profits from costshared intangibles were retained by head offices
that had no employees, no tangible assets, and no
physical presence anywhere in the world. Under
the cost-sharing agreement, the Irish subsidiaries

13

S. Murphy (Inspector of Taxes) v. Dataproducts (Dub.) Ltd., [1988] I. R.

10.
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obtained ownership of 60 percent of Apple’s
worldwide intangibles14 even though the U.S.
parent, Apple Inc., performed 95 percent of
worldwide research and development.
Cost-sharing participants like the Irish
subsidiaries obtain intangible ownership rights
through two types of payments: buy-in and costsharing.
Buy-in payments — now formally known as
platform contribution transactions — are
payments to acquire rights to preexisting
intangibles.15 For instance, the Irish subsidiaries
needed to obtain rights to use any intangibles that
Apple Inc. had developed before the cost-sharing
arrangement began. Aggressive valuations that
lowball the amount of buy-in payments
frequently play a major role in profit shifting. The
Veritas case with a tenfold difference in valuations
— the taxpayer valued the buy-in at $166 million
while the IRS’s valuation came in at $1.68 billion
— demonstrates the magnitude of the stakes
involved.16 The buy-in amounts in Apple are not
public information. Notably, Apple’s original
cost-sharing arrangement dates back to 1980,
which is four years before buy-in payments even
17
became mandatory. There were likely additional
transfers of intangibles later for which buy-ins
were made, but a great deal of time has passed
since the bulk of the transfers, and the statute of
limitations almost certainly expired long ago.
Suffice it to say, if the European Commission fails
in claiming Apple’s shifted profits for Europe, the
IRS will not succeed in claiming them for the
treasury either — at least not at the 35 percent
corporate tax rate applicable when the rights were
shifted.
Using cost-sharing payments to shift profits is
also common, but the scale of profit shifting is
much less significant. Because Apple’s Irish
subsidiaries performed very little R&D, they were
required to make payments to Apple Inc. to fund
their share of the R&D program. In exchange, the

subsidiaries obtained ownership interests and the
right to exploit any intangibles developed. As
owners of the rights, they would not have to pay
a royalty to Apple Inc. When R&D efforts are
wildly successful — as in Apple’s case — the costsharing payments would be far less expensive
than the royalties that the subsidiaries would
have had to pay if they licensed the intangibles
instead. It is quite possible that Apple pushed the
envelope and minimized the size of cost-sharing
payments. On the other hand, it is also possible
that the IRS adjusted Apple’s cost-sharing
payments upon audit and successfully exacted
the proverbial pound of flesh. In any event, if
Apple succeeded in shifting any profit through
cost sharing, the tax on the shifted profit would be
a small fraction of the €13 billion sought by the
European Commission.
In short, the U.S. transfer pricing rules were
not up to the task of reining in Apple’s tax
planning. What about the other remedy the
senators proposed: Could existing rules be used
to subject the Irish subsidiaries’ profits to current
U.S. taxation? There are two primary routes that
could be used to achieve this: taxing Apple Inc. on
the subsidiaries’ subpart F income, or taxing the
subsidiaries themselves on income effectively
connected with a U.S. trade or business. Lee A.
Sheppard explored both approaches in great
18
detail in a recent article, and I will not address
them at length here. The statute of limitations has
certainly run on the subpart F approach, but the
U.S. trade or business approach may still be viable
if the Irish subsidiaries did not file U.S. tax returns
on a protective basis. Under either of these
approaches, the 35 percent corporate tax rate —
that is, the rate that was in effect at the time the
profits were earned — would apply.
Before moving on to the European perspective
on Apple’s profit shifting, it is worth noting a
quote from former Treasury official Robert Stack:
We are greatly concerned that the EU
commission is reaching out to tax income
that no member state has the right to tax
under internationally accepted standards.
The mere fact that the U.S. system has left

14

Specifically, the intangibles related to 60 percent of Apple’s sales.
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Reg. section 1.482-7.
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Veritas Software Corp. v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. 297 (2009).
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The United States enacted the current version of section 367(d) in
1984. Previously, in accordance with a ruling process, intangible
property that was to be used in a foreign business could generally be
contributed to a foreign subsidiary tax-free.
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Sheppard, “What About Cupertino?” Tax Notes Federal, July 27,
2020, p. 565.
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these amounts untaxed until repatriated
does not provide under international tax
standards a right for another jurisdiction
19
to tax those amounts.
This argument sounds plausible but does not
hold water. Stack was referring to the longstanding U.S. tax principle known as deferral: If a
foreign subsidiary of a U.S. corporation earned
income that was not subpart F income, neither the
foreign subsidiary nor the U.S. parent was subject
to U.S. tax until the subsidiary paid a dividend to
the parent out of those earnings. By allowing
deferral, the United States essentially conceded
that the income was earned abroad; otherwise, a
transfer pricing adjustment should have been
made to bring the income home immediately. If
the income was earned abroad, then
internationally accepted standards would allow
the country where the income was earned to tax it.
The fact that the TCJA ended deferral and treated
deferred income as repatriated as of the end of
2017 does not change this reality.
B. The EU Perspective
The European Commission took Apple at its
word. Apple’s story was that intangible property
related to business in the Americas belonged to
Apple Inc., while intangible property related to
the rest of the world belonged to the Irish
subsidiaries. It was a simple story. From a
perspective of substance over form, the natural
conclusion was that Ireland should have the right
to tax profits from the intangible property. Under
state aid rules, the commission goes a step further
and contends that Ireland had the responsibility
to tax those profits.
Apple told different stories to Ireland and the
United States. Under Irish law at the time, the
general rule was that corporations were taxable
on their worldwide income either if they were
managed and controlled in Ireland or if they were
formally incorporated in Ireland. The major
loophole that Apple exploited was that a
company incorporated in Ireland that was not

managed in Ireland would not be subject to Irish
taxation if its ultimate parent was from a country
that had a tax treaty with Ireland and the parent
20
had a taxable branch in Ireland. Because the
United States was a treaty partner of Ireland, the
head offices of Apple’s Irish subsidiaries were not
taxable despite Ireland’s general system of
worldwide taxation. The story Apple told Ireland
was that the subsidiaries were not managed in
Ireland, implying that they were managed in the
United States. The story Apple told Levin and
McCain was that “Apple has not made a
determination regarding the location of [the Irish
subsidiaries’] central management and control.”21
The European Commission is the executive
branch of the EU. Its Directorate-General for
Competition is responsible for enforcing
competition law, including antitrust law and state
aid rules, based on the EU’s founding treaties. In
the state aid cases, the commission’s role is similar
to the Federal Trade Commission; to the extent it
asserts authority over tax matters, you could
consider the commission akin to the IRS.
Therefore, a commission decision is in no sense
legally binding. The opinion of the General Court
is the first word on what rule of law applies.
When Apple told Ireland that the subsidiaries
were managed and controlled outside of Ireland,
it made the same claim about the management
and control of Apple’s intangible property. Apple
claimed that the head offices of the subsidiaries
controlled the intangibles and were entitled to the
massive profits generated by them even though
the head offices had no employees, business
assets, or physical presence. The story was that
the intangibles were managed by the members of
the subsidiaries’ boards of directors, most of
whom were Americans employed by Apple Inc.
Managing the cost-sharing arrangement — a task
that primarily involved approving periodic
changes to the agreements — was a central part of
the directors’ responsibilities.
The employees of the Irish subsidiaries
22
performed a variety of functions. All of these
employees were located in Ireland and were

20
21
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Stephanie Bodoni, “EU Accused of Targeting US Firms in Fiscal
Deals Crackdown,” The Irish Times, Jan. 29, 2016.

22

See Apple commission decision, supra note 4, at paras. 48-49.
Senate report, supra note 3, at 23.
Apple judgment, supra note 5, at paras. 9-10.
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indisputably performing functions related to the
operations of the taxable branches rather than to
the head offices. One subsidiary was responsible
for the sales and distribution of Apple products
throughout the world (except for in the
Americas), including procurement, sales and
distribution, logistics, and after-sales service
functions. The other subsidiary was responsible
for the manufacture and assembly of a specialized
range of computer products, with key tasks
including planning and scheduling, process
engineering, production and operations, quality
assurance, and quality control. Although these
functions were nowhere near as important to
Apple’s global success as the tasks performed by
Apple Inc., they did play an important role. Both
Ireland and Apple argued that they were
essentially routine functions and could be
benchmarked by reference to independent
companies. Applying the transactional net
margin method — the OECD’s equivalent to the
U.S. comparable profits method in reg. section
1.482-5 — the Irish rulings allocated enough profit
to the branches to provide them with a markup on
their operating costs. For our purposes, we can
assume that these profits would be adequate if no
profit from Apple’s intangibles were allocated to
the branches.
By allocating profits to the branches using a
cost-plus method, the Irish rulings effectively
allocated the remaining profits — in excess of
€100 billion over the 10-year period at issue — to
the head offices. In contrast, the European
Commission argued that all of these profits
should be allocated to the branches and taxed by
Ireland; since the head offices had no substance or
activities, the commission suggested that
allocating any profit at all to them would be
sanctioning profit shifting.
II. Brief Overview of State Aid Rules
Article 107 of the TFEU prevents member
states from providing financial aid that “distorts
or threatens to distort” competition by favoring
some companies over others. Illegal state aid
requires four elements:
• an intervention using state resources;
• that is liable to affect trade between member
states;

• confers an advantage on a particular
beneficiary; and
• threatens to distort competition.
The classic case of state aid is when a country
provides a direct subsidy to a local corporation to
promote it as a national champion in a particular
industry.
A potential stumbling block for the European
Commission in the recent state aid cases is that
income taxation is the province of the individual
23
member states under EU law. Generally, EU
institutions lack the authority to attempt to
harmonize taxation among the member states.
However, because forgoing the collection of tax
that a local enterprise would otherwise owe is the
economic equivalent of providing a subsidy, the
state aid rules must be able to reach some matters
of taxation. EU case law puts some guardrails
around state aid investigations of tax matters.
Proving state aid in taxation requires three steps:
• establishing a reference system that
represents the normal rules of taxation
under national law;
• demonstrating that an action by the member
state is a derogation from the reference
system; and
• showing that the derogation selectively
favors a specific enterprise.
III. An Autonomous Arm’s-Length Principle?
In the state aid cases, the beleaguered nations
— including Ireland as an intervenor in Fiat and
the Netherlands as a party in Starbucks — argued
that they have sole authority to determine
whether and how the arm’s-length principle
should be applied. More specifically, the states
argued that the reference system should be the
country’s overall system of taxation, including the
transfer pricing rules as they are actually applied.
Under this view, there would be no autonomous
arm’s-length principle. Instead, the arm’s-length
principle would only apply to the extent it was
incorporated into national law.
The European Commission countered that the
reference system should be the country’s general
system of corporate taxation, which aims to tax

23
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both integrated and stand-alone companies on
their corporate profits. The commission focused
on the tax base, concluding that corporate profits
must reflect a market-based outcome for both
types of companies, which meant that a group
member’s profits must comport with the arm’slength principle whether or not the country had
explicitly incorporated the principle in its national
tax system. In both Starbucks and Fiat, the
commission contended that if a given measure in
a member state’s tax law allows a group company
to calculate taxable profits that are lower than
those that would result from arm’s-length pricing,
then that measure is a derogation from the
reference system and violates article 107 of the
TFEU by giving a selective advantage to the
company. The commission argued that this
conclusion necessarily flows from the CJEU’s
24
opinion in Belgium and Forum 187 — a
proposition that is debatable (and is discussed
below).
The General Court agreed with the
commission on each of these points, using similar
— and at times identical — language in both Fiat
and Starbucks. In paragraph 141 of the Fiat
judgment and paragraph 149 of the Starbucks
judgment, the court writes:
Where national tax law does not make a
distinction between integrated
undertakings and stand-alone
undertakings for the purposes of their
liability to corporate income tax, that law is
intended to tax the profit arising from the
economic activity of such an integrated
undertaking as though it had arisen from
transactions carried out at market prices.
In both opinions, the court explicitly cites the
Belgium judgment as authority for this
proposition. Using nearly identical language in
Fiat (paragraph 143) and Starbucks (paragraph
151) judgments, the court approves of the
commission’s use of the arm’s-length principle to
exercise its powers under article 107 TFEU, calling
the principle a tool that the commission can use to
establish a benchmark to determine whether an

integrated company is receiving a selective
advantage.25
It is unambiguously clear that the court bases
both decisions on an autonomous arm’s-length
principle. Because the principle derives from EU
competition law rather than from national tax law
or treaties, the court notes that the commission is
not formally bound by the OECD transfer pricing
guidelines. The court does, however,
acknowledge their persuasive value. In paragraph
147 of the Fiat judgment (and with nearly identical
language in paragraph 155 of the Starbucks
judgment), the General Court states:
The fact remains that those guidelines are
based on important work carried out by
groups of renowned experts, that they
reflect the international consensus
achieved with regard to transfer pricing
and that they thus have a certain practical
significance in the interpretation of issues
relating to transfer pricing.
Of course, the General Court does not have
the final word on the law of the European Union.
That is the province of the CJEU. And Fiat has
appealed the decision against it to that
authoritative tribunal. So the question becomes:
How will the autonomous arm’s-length principle
fare in that appeal?
Some have argued that contrary to the
General Court’s conclusion, the CJEU did not
establish an autonomous principle in its Belgium
26
judgment. It is true that the CJEU found that the
relevant Belgian tax regime violated state aid
rules because it was not consistent with the arm’slength principle. However, it is not clear whether
the Court considered the arm’s-length principle to
be part of the reference system because the
principle was already part of Belgium’s ordinary
corporate tax law or whether the Court relied on
an autonomous EU principle.
Similarly, it could be argued that the General
Court’s conclusion in both Fiat and Starbucks that
there is an autonomous arm’s-length principle
was superfluous because, as the court recognizes
in each case, both Luxembourg and the
25

24

Belgium and Forum 187 ASBL v. Commission, joined cases C-182/03
and C-217/03 (CJEU 2006) (hereinafter, Belgium judgment).

Fiat judgment, supra note 10, at para. 143; Starbucks judgment, supra
note 10, para. 151.
26

See, e.g., Daly, supra note 6.
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Netherlands incorporate the arm’s-length
principle in their general corporate tax systems.27
Indeed, the court inoculated itself against reversal
in paragraphs 297 to 299 of the Fiat opinion by
agreeing with the commission’s subsidiary
argument that Luxembourg granted state aid
because its ruling violated the arm’s-length
principle as incorporated in Luxembourg’s own
general tax system.
IV. The Leap to Branch Profit Allocations
Reaching the conclusion that the arm’s-length
principle is embedded in the TFEU’s prohibition
against state aid required the European
Commission and the General Court to take a leap
of imagination. Unlike national tax laws and
treaties governing the setting of transfer prices
between affiliated companies, article 107 of the
TFEU makes no mention of the arm’s-length
principle. The leap of imagination is the
conclusion that a group entity that doesn’t need to
ensure that it conducts transactions with affiliates
at arm’s length would have a competitive
advantage over stand-alone companies that can
only engage in arm’s-length transactions. That is,
the integrated company could report profits that
are smaller than the stand-alone competitor and
thereby incur a lower tax burden.
To be more precise, the competitive advantage
arises from the ability of the affiliated group to
shift the profits that the integrated affiliate should
have earned out of the tax environment in which
the potential competitor operates and into a
lower-tax environment. If profits were shifted
between two affiliated companies that bear
similar tax burdens, the group would not achieve
any competitive advantage over its competitors,
whether those competitors happen to be affiliated
groups or stand-alone companies. State aid rules
do not put the burden on the commission to show
this level of detail. It is sufficient to show that the
country under investigation has given an
unjustified tax break.
Both Fiat and Starbucks involved transfer
prices for transactions between affiliated
companies. The situation in Apple is different

because it involves the allocation of profits
between the head office and a branch of a single
corporation (or, more precisely, the allocation of
profits between two companies’ head offices and
a branch of each). The same reasoning that led the
General Court to apply the arm’s-length principle
to transactions between affiliates applies with
equal force to the allocation of profits to a branch.
That is, if the branch could report lower taxable
profits on its dealings than a stand-alone
company undertaking similar dealings, the
branch would have a competitive advantage over
the stand-alone competitor. The European
Commission was prepared to take a similar leap
of imagination in Apple’s case to that reflected in
28
Fiat and Starbucks, but the General Court seems
to be more reluctant. As we will see, the court’s
opinion on this point is not entirely clear.
Hopefully, the CJEU will be more decisive on
appeal.
The Apple court does not dispute the Starbucks
holding that an autonomous arm’s-length
principle exists in the case of transfer pricing
between affiliates. Rather, paragraph 205 of the
Apple judgment merely notes that Apple’s
situation is different than that at issue in
Starbucks. Further, the following paragraph
recognizes that the arm’s-length principle may
lend itself to being applied by analogy to branch
profit determinations. But the court strongly
states that there is no free-standing obligation
under article 107 TFEU to apply the arm’s-length
principle to branch profits if the national law does
not specify that branches should be taxed as if
they were operating under market conditions.29 It
seems clear that the court is refusing to extend the
autonomous arm’s-length principle to branches.
Or is it? The court seems to equivocate with
paragraph 214 stating:
Article 107(1) TFEU allows the
Commission to check whether that level of
profit corresponds to the level that would
have been obtained through carrying on
that trade under market conditions. . . .
The arm’s length principle, as described by
the Commission in the contested decision,

28
27

See Fiat judgment, supra note 10, at para. 13 (Luxembourg law); and
Starbucks judgment, supra note 10, at para. 7 (Netherlands law).

1630

29

Apple judgment, supra note 5, at paras. 195 and 197.
Id. at paras. 221 and 207.
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is thus a tool enabling the Commission to
make that determination in the exercise of
its powers under Article 107(1) TFEU.
While the court seems to contradict itself, it
may be possible to reconcile the seemingly
conflicting holdings. The court might be saying
that member states are not required to apply the
arm’s-length principle, but that if states choose to
apply it, then the commission is fully empowered
to apply the principle independently — without
deferring to how national authorities do so. Even
though Ireland had not formally adopted the
arm’s-length principle in legislation at the time it
issued the Apple rulings,30 the court finds that
Ireland had effectively adopted the principle
through administrative practice, case law, and tax
treaties.31
Whether it springs from Irish law or stems
from the EU’s founding treaties, the court does
indeed apply a version of the arm’s-length
principle to assessing whether the Irish branch
profits were correct. It is axiomatic that profits
under the arm’s-length principle must be
consistent with functions performed, assets
employed, and risks assumed by the enterprises
involved. The court approves of the advance tax
rulings that Ireland provided to Apple based on a
unilateral review of the functions performed by
the branches and a benchmarking of market
returns earned by companies performing similar
functions. While this unilateral approach may be
consistent with Irish law, it does not reflect
international best practices. The approach has two
defects: It does not include a comparative review
of the functions performed by the head offices,
and it does not give adequate consideration to the
assets used in the business.
V. Allocation of Assets and Contracts
Before considering how assets would be
allocated between a head office and a branch
under an autonomous arm’s-length principle, let
us recap how we got to this point. In Fiat and
Starbucks, the General Court took a leap and
found an autonomous arm’s-length principle for
transfer pricing between affiliates in the EU.

Ambiguities in the Apple opinion suggest that the
court’s imagination may be wavering on
extending the autonomous arm’s-length principle
to branch profit determinations. To apply the
principle autonomously, the court must be willing
to give international guidance on the topic
precedence over the idiosyncratic approach of a
member nation. Ambiguities aside, the Apple
court shows some willingness to apply the
internationally accepted AOA in the branch
profits context. However, when it comes to
actually allocating assets and contracts between a
head office and a branch in practice, the court’s
imagination fails. The court relies on Irish law —
the Dataproducts decision, in particular — to make
the actual allocation rather than the AOA.
The OECD formally adopted the AOA in its
2010 permanent establishment profits report,
which addresses the attribution of profits to PEs.
Before the 2010 report, there was considerable
variation and confusion among countries
regarding how they approached branch profits.
The report definitively adopted the AOA —
which is based on the arm’s-length principle — as
the preferred approach. Although the General
Court recognizes the significance of the AOA in
32
its Apple opinion, the court fails to follow
through with its application.
First and foremost, a head office and a branch
are not separate legal entities that transact
business with each other — they are two parts of
one legal entity. As the OECD explains in
paragraph 14 of the 2010 PE profits report, “there
is no single part of an enterprise which legally
‘owns’ the assets, assumes the risks, possesses the
capital or contracts with separate enterprises.” To
properly apply the arm’s-length principle, it is
necessary to allocate the assets, risks, capital, and
contracts of the larger enterprise to its constituent
parts. This allocation is the first step of the AOA.
There is no a priori reason to allocate any item to
the head office or to a branch. Instead, under the
AOA, items must be allocated based on a

32

See id. at para. 237 (the AOA is “of practical assistance when
interpreting questions relating to profit allocation” because it “is based
on work carried out by groups of experts and which reflects
international consensus regarding profit allocation to permanent
establishments”).

30

Id. at para. 217.

31

Id. at paras. 218-220.
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comparison of the “significant people functions”
that each part of the enterprise performs.33
Ultimately, Apple’s case turns entirely on
whether the intangible property rights that the
Irish subsidiaries own should be allocated to the
head offices or to the branches. There is no serious
dispute that the Irish rulings allocated adequate
profits to the branches to compensate them for
their routine functions. Lacking any employees,
the head offices had no routine functions to
compensate. The residual profits — the profits at
issue in the case — were wholly attributable to the
intangibles. The General Court quite
compellingly demonstrates that the most
important significant people functions involved
in management and exploitation of the
intangibles were performed by employees of
34
Apple Inc. Considering that Apple Inc.
employees performed these functions in
accordance with contracts between their
employer and the Irish subsidiaries — examples
of such contracts include the cost-sharing
agreement and a marketing services agreement —
the decisive issue is whether these contracts
should be allocated to the head offices or to the
branches.
In paragraph 186, the court faults the
European Commission for using a so-called
exclusion approach to allocate ownership of the
intangibles to the branches. That is, according to
the court, the commission automatically allocated
the intangibles to the branches because the head
offices had neither employees nor physical
presence to manage them. However, the court
actually uses an exclusion approach of its own.
The court, in paragraph 181, automatically
allocates the intangibles to the head offices
because the staff and directors of the branches did
not control the intangibles.
The court achieves this result by asserting that
the companies as a whole, acting through their

boards of directors, control the intangibles. This is
not unreasonable insofar as the boards approved
the contracts with Apple Inc., essentially
35
delegating control functions to U.S. employees.
Implicit in the court’s reasoning is the belief that
the actions of the board should be attributed to the
head office — a proposition that Dataproducts
supports36 — at least as long as the members of the
37
board are not residents of Ireland. However,
under the AOA, there is no stronger reason for
attributing the board’s actions to the head office
instead of the branch than there is for allocating
the assets or contracts in that manner.
Rather than an exclusion approach, the proper
application of the AOA would require comparing
the functions of the branch to those of the head
office. While the court seems to minimize the
importance of the branches’ activities, it is
undeniable that branch employees work with
Apple Inc. employees to implement technical
developments and execute marketing plans. Since
the head offices do nothing, the AOA’s
comparison approach clearly calls for allocating
the contracts entirely to the branches. The
allocation of the intangible property would follow
the contracts as would the allocation of the
residual profits derived from the intangible
property. In short, if the court followed the AOA,
it would uphold the commission’s decision rather
than annulling it. And Ireland would be forced to
38
accept the disputed €13 billion from Apple.
Two final points are worth making. First, the
commission was correct in taking an all-or-

35

See id. at para. 309 (arguing that the boards performed their
functions through delegation of powers to executives who were not
Irish).
36

The applicability of Dataproducts is questionable. In that case, the
Irish High Court decided that Ireland could not tax interest income from
a bank account of a company that was incorporated in Ireland, taxresident in Holland, and managed by Dutch directors, even though some
of the interest was used to fund the operations of the company’s Irish
branch. It is quite a stretch to compare “management” of a bank account
to management of intangible property that is critical to the global
business of the Apple sales branch.
37

Apple judgment, supra note 5, at para. 181 (“property belonging to a
company that is not resident in Ireland and controlled by the executives
of that company, who are also not resident in Ireland, cannot be allocated
to that company’s Irish branch”). Notably, each of the Irish subsidiaries
had one Irish resident board member. See Apple commission decision,
supra note 4, at para. 114. Therefore, applying the court’s reasoning,
should a proportionate share of the intangible property rights be
allocated to the Irish branches?
38

33

2010 PE profits report, supra note 12, at para. 21.

34

Apple judgment, supra note 5, at paras. 298-302.
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nothing approach. Second, final resolution of the
case does not turn on the burden on proof but on
39
a point of law. In his recent article, Robert
Goulder missed the point when he argued that the
commission was foolhardy to not present an
alternative transfer pricing analysis that would
support a partial recovery. If, as the commission
argues, the intangible rights are fully allocable to
the branches, then no further analysis is
necessary: All profits must be allocated to the
branches and none to the head offices. The
commission is clearly not interested in quibbling
over the amount of profit that should be allocated
to the branches if this point were conceded. The
resolution of the issue turns on a point of law:
Should the actions of the boards be automatically
attributed to the head offices? Because a point of
law is at issue, appeal to the CJEU is well founded.
I agree wholeheartedly with Goulder that the
commission “must” undertake the appeal.

competition law. Allowing each member state to
apply the arm’s-length principle in its own
idiosyncratic way — or to not apply it at all — is
an invitation for abuse. If the CJEU agrees with
this conclusion but is disinclined to approve the
commission’s decision in full, I believe that there
is a palatable solution available to the CJEU.
Recognizing that international guidance in the
form of the AOA was not available at the time
Ireland gave Apple the contested rulings, the
CJEU could hold that member states are only
under an obligation to apply international best
practices after they have been formally
articulated. That is, the CJEU could hold that the
principles advanced by this article should only
apply prospectively — and, thereby, find that
Ireland was blameless in granting the contested
tax rulings.


VI. Concluding Thoughts: New World Order
What’s done is done. The General Court is not
going to reconsider its position. Still, assuming
the European Commission appeals the case to the
CJEU, Apple’s €13 billion will likely remain in
escrow for now. So what will the CJEU do? Just
because the CJEU could reverse the General Court
does not mean it should.
Much has changed since the commission
initially brought the case against Apple and
Ireland. BEPS reforms, implemented to a large
extent in Europe and elsewhere, have made the
use of hybrid mismatches difficult. Ireland itself
closed the nonresident company loophole in
40
2014. Concerns about corporate reputation have
slowed aggressive tax planning in general.
Perhaps most importantly, the introduction of the
41
global intangible low-taxed income regime —
which is effectively a global minimum tax — has
greatly limited the benefits of aggressive planning
for U.S.-based multinationals.
Nonetheless, I believe that the autonomous
arm’s-length principle deserves its place in EU

39

Robert Goulder, “Why the European Commission Must Appeal the
Apple Decision,” Tax Notes Int’l, Aug. 17, 2020, p. 973.
40

See Apple commission decision, supra note 4, at 9.

41

Section 951A.
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